buying or selling a business is a big deal for most people

If you are selling, it’s is a one-time opportunity to monetise all the blood, sweat and tears you’ve invested in your business over the years.  If your buying, an acquisition can step your business up to the next level.

m&a experts in the tech space

We work with our tech company clients throughout their life-cycle to maximise value on exit.  We also help companies with a strategy of growth by acquisition. We advise on initial deal strategy and on the negotiation of letters of intent. Then once a deal has been agreed in principle, we do a lot of the heavy lifting around the negotiation of sale and purchase agreements, running due diligence and disclosure, and getting ducks in a row for completion.

with you at the negotiation table

Our corporate partners have acted on hundreds of acquisitions and exits over the course of their careers. They have helped clients buy and sell businesses all around the world, across a wide range of industry sectors and involving buyers and sellers from entrepreneurs to the largest multinationals. All love to share this experience with our tech clients as they prepare for the m&a journey.

“Julie was always two or three steps ahead of the negotiations – she had tact and forethought, and ensured we ended up in the right place.”

m&a resources

Restraints of trade are commonly used in New Zealand contracts – from mergers and acquisition(M&A) deals, in shareholders’ agreements and employment / contractor arrangements. They help protect business value, but if drafted too broadly or without clear justification, they risk being unenforceable.

In M&A and capital raising transactions, buyers and investors will carefully review restraints on founders or key employees / contractors to ensure there is the necessary protection of IP, customer relationships, and know-how.

This guide outlines the types of interests that can be protected, key factors courts might consider, and how restraints are typically applied in corporate transactions – along with some practical tips.

Restraints presumed invalid unless reasonable

The landmark case of Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co [1894] held that a restraint is prima facie unlawful, but it may be upheld if it is reasonable in the interests of the parties to the contract and with reference to the interests of the public.

To be enforceable, a restraint must:

  • protect a legitimate business interest
  • go no further than reasonably necessary in terms of duration, geography, and scope.

In short, the restraint must provide adequate protection, but nothing more.

What can be protected?

A restraint cannot simply prevent competition for its own sake. The law will not protect a party from ordinary commercial competition. Instead, the restraint must be connected to a specific interest, such as:

  • trade connections (e.g. client or supplier relationships)
  • confidential business information
  • know-how or intellectual property
  • goodwill of a business being sold.

Two common types of restraint clauses

Non-compete

Prevents a person from working for, or establishing, a competing business within a defined area and timeframe.

Non-solicitation

Prevents a person from contacting or poaching former clients, customers, suppliers, or employees. These tend to be narrower and more enforceable, especially in the employment context.

Reasonableness of restraint depends on scope

Restraints must be reasonable and proportionate. Courts will closely examine the scope of the restraint if necessary, considering:

1. The activity being restrained

Is the restriction narrowly targeted (e.g., preventing contact with certain clients) or a broad ban on competing in an entire industry? Narrow restraints are more likely to be enforceable. E.g. in the AANZ template shareholders’ agreement, a competing entity is defined as any business or other undertaking, which is directly competitive with the Business or any material part of the Business. The defined term Business should be reviewed carefully and, in some cases, a narrower defined concept of Restricted Business may be required.

2. The geographical area

A restraint covering a small local area may be reasonable for a small business; a nationwide or international restriction may be justified for a larger company. If the business is likely to expand overseas, consider if the geographical area should include jurisdictions where the business might operate in the future.

3. The duration of the restraint

While no strict limits exist, restraints lasting 3 years are generally seen as the upper bound in the M&Acontext (see below), but employment restraints tend to be much shorter (e.g. 3 -12 months). But each must be justified.

In addition, restraints in employment / contractor agreements could receive closer scrutiny if challenged, especially if the employee or contractor is junior, the restraint is broad in scope, or the employer cannot identify a specific protectable interest.

Uses in corporate transactions

M&A

Restraints are generally included in sale and purchase agreements as part of M&A deals. They apply to the sellers (whether in share or asset sales) with the rationale to protect a business’ core working knowledge, and ultimately the goodwill being transferred. While a buyer is likely to prefer that the restraints to apply to all sellers regardless of their involvement in the business, there are typically exclusions for:

  • private equity, venture capital and other institutional investors for whom restraints are simply unworkable; and
  • large groups of small sellers.

Buyers typically require non-compete and non-solicitation clauses binding sellers for at least 24-36 months post completion of the sale. Restraints on the sellers of a business in favour of the buyer are upheld more readily than restraints on an employee in favour of their employer. This reflects the substantial value exchanged and more balanced bargaining power in company or business sales (compared to the employer – employee relationship).

Shareholders’ Agreements

Restraints in shareholders’ agreements usually apply to founders and sometimes key employee shareholders due to their knowledge of the business. The restraints aim to:

  • prevent restrained shareholders from competing during and after exiting the business
  • protect confidential information, trade connections, and goodwill, and
  • provide comfort to investors that key people won’t damage the business on exit.

These restraints typically apply while the person is a shareholder, and often for a specified period after exiting the business (e.g. 12–24 months). Restraints in shareholders’ agreements have not been conclusively tested by New Zealand courts, so enforceability remains more uncertain. But the High Court has held that restraints in shareholders’ agreements (as with all restraints) must focus on a legitimate proprietary interest that requires protection. To maximise enforceability, shareholder restraints should be reasonably scoped and connected to a legitimate interest.

One issue companies and founders should consider is when the restraint period runs from – usually from the date they cease to be either (i) a shareholder or (ii) employed, or engaged as a contractor, by the business. In the NZ context, the restraint period often lands on being the earlier of those two events. Investors might argue that a founder who has ceased to work for a company but who retains a shareholding should not compete. On the other hand, a departing founder has no guarantee of any party acquiring their shares on their exit, so the restraints could continue forever. This is not reasonable, nor likely to be upheld by a court.

Legislative developments and global trends

The Employment Relations (Restraint of Trade) Amendment Bill, currently at its second reading, proposes significant changes to restraints in employment agreements, including:

  • making non-compete clauses unenforceable against employees earning less than three times the minimum wage
  • requiring compensation of at least 50% of the average weekly wage during any restraint period

Notably the Bill does not include specific carve-outs for M&A transactions or shareholder restraints, potentially affecting how restraints are structured in all cases going forward. While the Bill focuses on employment agreements, its impact could ripple into other areas, particularly where employee-like roles overlap with shareholder or contractor positions. This is, of course, all yet to be seen with the Bill some way off becoming law (if at all).

There has also been a shift to try and restrict the use of non-competes in places such as the US, the UK and parts of the EU. But, in most cases, those restrictions are not intended to apply to non-competes imposed in connection with M&A deals.

Final thoughts

Restraints of trade are vital for protecting sensitive business interests but must be considered carefully. You should:

  • ensure there is a specific protectable interest
  • keep restraints no broader than necessary in activity, geography, and duration
  • consider the relationship between the parties and the commercial context to assess reasonableness
  • consider the restraint period, and when it runs from
  • define the restricted business accurately and fairly in the context of a non-compete.

In many M&A deals, including for tech companies, the buyer and seller(s) include a mechanism in the sale and purchase agreement (SPA) to potentially adjust the final purchase price for the business being sold. Particularly, if there is period of time between signing of the SPA and completion, a buyer will want to ensure that the business continues to operate in the ordinary course of business and if there is any reduction in value, the price be adjusted downwards to reflect this. Similarly, if a buyer has not done significant financial due diligence, purchase price adjustments in the SPA enable a buyer to mitigate its risk.

The two common mechanisms used to adjust the purchase price between signing of the SPA and completion are completion accounts and a locked box adjustment. We look at each in turn.

completion accounts

A completion accounts mechanism is typically preferred by buyers. The SPA sets out an initial purchase price. However, the final price is determined a short period after completion based on the actual balance sheet of the target business prepared as at the completion date. Typically, the period to agree the completion accounts might be 2 or 3 months after completion. Consequently, a buyer gets comfort that if the value of the target business is less than they had anticipated through their financial due diligence, or as a result of actions of seller(s) after signing, the purchase price will be adjusted downwards.

Completion accounts often show the net assets of the target business as at completion, including a balance sheet, and a profit and loss account showing the financial performance for the period from the latest set of financial accounts up to completion.

A well drafted completion accounts mechanism will set out the rules for preparing, challenging and agreeing the completion accounts. Sometimes the buyer will prepare the completion accounts for review by the seller(s), or it may be the other way round – it depends on who practically is best placed to prepare them. Another key point to agree is the applicable accounting policy that should apply to the preparation and review of the accounts. As a starting point, you would expect this to be consistent with the way the accounts had been prepared by the target business prior to completion.

Sometimes there may be an adjustment to the purchase price by reference to an agreed level of target working capital required in the business as at completion, depending on how this compares to the real position as at completion.

Overall, buyers prefer completion accounts as it enables a dollar-for-dollar adjustment post completion, therefore mitigating the risk that the balance sheet of the target business materially changes between signing and closing, or is not fully aligned with what was presented to them during due diligence. The downside is the period of time needed to prepare, discuss and agree the completion accounts and how this distracts management.

locked box

Sellers often prefer a locked box mechanism to finalise the purchase price. The process provides greater certainty as to the value of the business being sold at completion.

The mechanism is called a locked box as the key feature is that no value is permitted to leave the business between the locked box date (agreed in the SPA) until completion. The balance sheet is therefore “locked”. If there is any such leakage, the seller(s) will be required to repay the relevant reduction in value to the buyer, effectively reducing the purchase price.

Parties to an SPA generally agree that certain permitted leakage is allowed. This covers items both parties are aware of prior to completion, which is in effect already factored into the sale price. Permitted leakage often relates to matters which occur outside the seller(s)’ control, but can also cover agreed transactions between the target business and the sellers such as dividends, salary or other fees payable in the relevant period.

The date the locked box is fixed is a key aspect. A buyer will want its financial due diligence to be adequate up to that date. Having a long period between the locked box date and completion is likely to result in a greater chance of leakage. Bear in mind however that sufficient time is required to enable the seller to prepare the balance sheet for review by the buyer before completion. Sometimes the locked box date is the target business’ last financial year end, which has the benefit of allowing audited accounts to be used as opposed to a new balance sheet created just for this purpose.

As the purchase price for the target business is effectively fixed on the basis of the locked box accounts as at the applicable date, the buyer will expect the seller to stand behind the accuracy of those accounts. Sometimes more extensive warranties are required by a buyer covering the period from the locked box date to completion. Sellers should resist these warranties given the whole purpose of this mechanism is to fix the purchase price (and inclusion of these warranties starts to make it look more like a completion accounts adjustment).

A final key feature of a locked box mechanism is how to deal with accrued value movement in the balance sheet due to the business continuing to operate between the locked box date and the completion date. Sellers may expect to be compensated for this via an upward adjustment to the purchase price (assumes the business is profitable). This adjustment is called the “value accrual”. For tech company sales, this concept is less likely to be relevant.

round up

The key difference between a locked box transaction, as opposed to using completion accounts, is that the balance sheet on which the purchase price is determined is fixed before signing. This is a useful tool for sellers as it has a higher degree of certainty of the purchase price. It also makes for a cleaner deal with no discussion post deal on pricing (assuming no non-permitted leakage has occurred in which event the buyer will have a claim under the SPA). This takes up less management time post-closing than where completion accounts have to be prepared and agreed.

Buyers may be reluctant to go down the locked box route where they have carried out limited financial due diligence and will prefer the comfort of completion accounts. Particularly, if the financial performance or working capital of the target business is subject to volatility. If a locked box mechanism is adopted, buyers will want to include a list of restricted activities between signing and closing to mitigate their risk given they are taking on the economic risk of trading from the locked box date.

BY LEE BAGSHAW

Payments behemoth Square recently announced its intention to acquire buy-now-pay-later player Afterpay in a USD30million deal. In the ultimate buy-now-pay-later acquisition, the terms of the all-share deal mean shareholders in Afterpay will need to wait a little longer to cash out.

Square of course is publicly listed so its shares are liquid. Investors can therefore cash out in due course, subject to applicable lock in periods. But what about if a private or non-listed tech company offers to acquire your company? And instead of cash, they fully or partially offer shares as consideration? This scenario is increasingly common as even well-backed startups do not typically have large cash resources to fund acquisitions.

What should sellers in these circumstances be thinking about? In this guide we unpack some key factors to consider.

who’s the buyer?

Before getting into negotiation of the key commercial and legal terms of the deal, the first question is – who is the buyer? And what are its plans? Is it already listed or looking to IPO, or even seeking a listing of the enlarged group via a SPAC process?

If the answer is none of the above, then the buyer is likely to remain a private company up to an exit. Therefore your shareholders are in effect exchanging illiquid shares in the target for a smaller shareholding in a larger buyer entity, whilst losing control of the business at the same time.

This means that the prospects and plans of the buyer should be key to your decision to sell. The ability to cash out via a successful exit will be dependent on the prospects of the larger combined business. And all the key strategic decisions, including whether and when to sell, will of course be made by others going forwards.

part cash / share consideration

One factor to consider is how the consideration (the purchase price) will be split between cash and shares, and whether all shareholders in the target company will receive the same deal.

Your investors may prefer to cash out as part of sale of the company rather than receive shares in another private company. Part of their decision making will be based on how well they consider the prospects of the buyer. Further, if the buyer is based in a foreign jurisdiction, investors sometimes can have issues with receiving consideration shares if the buyer’s place of domicile is outside of the scope of their fund mandate.

valuation

A key aspect you need to agree at the term sheet stage is of course the valuation of the consideration shares to be issued to the sellers. This, along with the valuation of the target company being sold, determines what percentage of equity sellers will own in the buyer.

If your potential buyer is a private company, this might be based on the valuation of their most recent financing, or any more recent valuation they have obtained independently. Or it might just the view of the board of the buyer. Either way, you should undertake financial due diligence and challenge this valuation where necessary. Between the timing of signing the non-binding term sheet and closing of the transaction there should be scope for the valuation to be adjusted subject to material due diligence findings.

Finally, unlike with an all-cash sale, shareholders of the acquired target will be partners in the post-acquisition business and will therefore have as much interest in ensuring that there are synergies between the two businesses as the current shareholders of the buyer.

class of shares

Valuation is one thing. The class of shares that sellers receive as consideration is just as important. If the buyer has raised several rounds of venture financing, it will inevitably have a liquidation preference stack.

This is important for sellers to understand early in their diligence process. The class of shares is often a key negotiation point. If you receive ordinary shares in the buyer as consideration for the sale proceeds, those ordinary shares will sit behind any preferred shares that are in issue. This is particularly relevant for your investors who may be reluctant to in effect exchange their existing preference shares for ordinary shares in the buyer.

due diligence

On any M&A deal, a buyer will carry out financial, legal and commercial due diligence on the target company. In the same way, sellers will want to do the same thing on the buyer in circumstances where shares are offered as consideration. As mentioned above, this would cover the financial due diligence (to validate the buyer’s valuation).

We also recommend legal due diligence on key aspects such as the buyer share structure, its governance arrangements, whether there is any debt or key liabilities, and any material contractual matters, amongst other things. For example, if there are any convertible securities which would further dilute shareholders in the buyer.

warranties from the buyer

To support any due diligence on the buyer, sellers should also insist on the buyer providing certain warranties. If the buyer fails to disclose an issue which represent a breach of warranty, sellers will want to be compensated in the same way as a buyer would be if they were in breach.

Ideally these buyer warranties would be equivalent to the warranties being provided by the sellers. However sometimes buyers will only offer basic warranties around the shares to be issued as consideration. Ultimately, this is an issue for negotiation in the sale and purchase agreement.

warranties, liability and price adjustment

As with any M&A deal, your investors may be reluctant to stand behind business warranties and liability for breach of such warranties. With all-cash deals, often the liability gap between buyer expectation and sellers wanting to minimise their potential liability is resolved by way of an escrow account, from which claims can be met pro-rata from all sellers.

With all-share deals, sellers are unlikely to want to reimburse a buyer for breaches in cash. To deal with this, typically some consideration shares will be held back (or escrowed) by the buyer for a period to meet any claims, or alternatively the buyer may have an ability to claw back shares from sellers if there is determined claim (or a combination of both of these).

approval rights in the buyer

In all-share deals, sellers transition from full owners who exercise control over their business to minority owners of the combined business. In these types of acquisitions, shareholders in the selling company might end up with around 15-20% of the equity in the buyer once all the consideration shares are issued.

This means that realistically, investors cannot expect to retain the kind of control in the buyer as they might have had previously in the target company. Founders of the target are the same. They might get a single board seat but will not be making material decisions. In terms of approval rights, most likely the sellers will simply be able be vote alongside all other shareholders in the buyer, but nothing much more than this.

restrictions on shares transfers

Your investors may have limited or even no restrictions on their ability to sell shares in your company. That may not be the case in respect of their shares in the buyer. Again, this requires some due diligence on the governance documents of the buyer. Practically, it is unlikely that material changes will be made to the buyer’s governance documents as this will require agreement from all its shareholders.

In addition, as part of any warranty period, there may be a restriction on selling shares for some time. Selling shares to a listed buyer is very different as lock-ins period are typically required by law or under the applicable stock exchange rules. Even for private company buyers, there may be contractual restrictions on selling shares for a period.

round up

If you are selling your company to a listed company like Square and being issued shares as consideration, it is fair to say that things are somewhat easier. As a listed company, the buyer will have a fixed valuation at any time. Financial information is publicly available which is likely to require less due diligence. Consideration shares issued by a listed buyer should be the same class as the listed shares and they will be capable of being sold easily in the market subject to any lock-in periods.

For a sale to a private company, all-shares deals bring more issues to think about, and due diligence on the buyer is essential. Otherwise, it will not simply be a case of buy-now-pay-later — the expected pay day may not come at all.

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